Long-term scenarios: energy pathways in the UK by Tavoni, Alessandro
  
Alessandro Tavoni 
Long-term scenarios: energy pathways in 
the UK 
 
Article (Accepted version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 Original citation: Tavoni, Alessandro (2017) Long-term scenarios: energy pathways in the UK. Nature Energy, 2 
(17034). ISSN 2058-7546 
 
DOI: 10.1038/nenergy.2017.34 
 
© 2017 Macmillan Publishers Limited, part of Springer Nature 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/69869/ 
 
Available in LSE Research Online: March 2017 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
This document is the author’s final accepted version of the journal article. There may be 
differences between this version and the published version.  You are advised to consult the 
publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 LONG-TERM SCENARIOS  
Energy pathways in the UK 
 
The bottom-up approach promoted through the Paris Agreement and signed in 2016 requires 
the definition of accurate and realistic national pathways to cut emissions. A recent study 
applied to the UK energy system shows that current UK policy on climate change is 
incompatible with the most stringent climate objectives.  
 
Alessandro Tavoni1 
 
 
The failed attempt to agree on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol at the 15th Conference of the 
Parties (COP 15) in Copenhagen in 2009 initiated a new bottom-up approach to climate 
cooperation that culminated with the COP 21 negotiations. The Paris Agreement marks a 
milestone in the history of climate negotiations. It solidifies the recent move away from the top-
down architecture around which the Kyoto protocol was built, towards the loosely coordinated 
national pledges epitomised by the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC). NDC, the 
centrepiece of the recent Paris Agreement, are non-binding national pledges for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in the coming years. While the agreement has been largely 
welcomed as a success in breaking the negotiation stalemate on how to share equitably the 
burden of mitigation, the perceived diplomatic breakthrough is in part due to the watering down 
of its terms. While its predecessors relied on legally binding ‘targets and timetables’, the Paris 
Agreement relies on voluntary actions, in the hope that they will scale up to the task of “holding 
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels” 
[1]. The voluntary nature of the NDC begs the question of whether the national commitments 
undertaken in Paris will suffice to achieve such an ambitious target. In light of the above 
novelties, and given our seemingly insatiable appetite for fuel (Figure 1), which stands in stark 
contrast to the ambition to reach net-zero emissions in the second half of the century, it is of 
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paramount importance that research addresses the recent change in horizon by investigating 
emission corridors beyond 2050. Yet, owing to the tradition of using 2050 as a long-term target 
in Europe, and the fact that most NDC are expressed with reference to 2030, virtually no study 
has assessed the adequacy of national targets to achieve net-zero emissions later in the 
century. Writing in Nature Energy, Pye and co-authors, from the University College London, fill 
this gap by exploring different long-term mitigation scenarios for implementing full (rather than 
partial) decarbonisation, as mandated in the Paris Agreement. Using the UK as case study [2], 
the researchers apply effort sharing principles of equity and grandfathering (based on current 
total emissions) to carbon budgets [3].  
 
 
 
Figure 1 | Emission pathways for the UK energy system under different transition scenarios. The transition pathways (ref. 2) present 
different levels of stringency (590 or 1240 GtCO
2
) and two burden-sharing rules. The equity approach is the more ambitious one, 
requiring reduction measures that are in line with historical emissions levels, whereas the inertia scenario — which recalls the 
grandfathering approach in the Paris agreement — allocates a carbon allowance based on current emissions level. Under the equity 
scenarios the energy system is required to decarbonize more quickly compared to the inertia scenarios. Reproduced with 
permission from ref. 2, Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 
 
Pye and colleagues  explore two levels of stringency (590 GtCO2 vs 1240 GtCO2 carbon 
budget) and two burden sharing rules (equal per-capita basis, “Equity”, and one based on the 
2010 share of global emissions, “Inertia”). Given the UK’s high level of development, the equity 
scenario requires significantly more ambitious mitigation effort, compared to grandfathering.  
 The researchers define how these four decarbonisation trajectories scale down to the level of 
the UK energy system, offering a productive way to think about implementation of the Paris 
treaty, that replaces national targets with a collective decarbonisation objective. In such a 
bottom-up regime, the easiest way to achieving net-zero emissions, in the absence of costly 
large scale deployment of negative emissions technologies, is for all parties to fully decarbonise 
by the end of this century. The main finding of the study is that, as expected, the current UK 
policy on climate change is incompatible with the most stringent net-zero objectives to achieve 
zero emissions by 2050 embodied in the Equity 590 scenario. A more optimistic spin on the 
results of the study is that the current policy is not far off either the 590 Inertia or the 1240 
Equity trajectories. Both of these pathways would achieve net-zero emissions well before 2080, 
an objective which is more realistic than 2050, and is roughly in line with the “net-zero target no 
later than 2070” advocated by the authors. 
 
While this analysis introduces a welcome methodology and change of horizon, some questions 
remain unanswered, and call for further investigations. Firstly, is important to understand that 
national strategic responses to other parties’ mitigation efforts is an important part of the game 
[4], as ambitious targets abroad may induce free-riders to abate less at home. The accounting 
methodology employed in the in Pye et al. [2] assumes that, given the allocation framework, a 
similar effort will be displayed in other countries. In other words, it assumes that there will be 
tacit agreement on the target and no country deviates from it. However, while desirable, this is 
unlikely to be a realistic setup, especially in a post-Paris Agreement era characterised by 
voluntary NDC whose enforcement relies on soft ‘naming and shaming’. In addition, the large 
inequalities in fossil fuel use (Figure 2) call for differentiated responsibilities, which is likely to 
exacerbate the risk of opportunistic behaviours inducing parties to delay mitigation action [5].  
 
Further real-world complications that are likely to influence the formation and implementation of 
climate policy include bargaining power and domestic politics. The former has the potential to 
skew burden-sharing in favour of more powerful actors (towards less stringent commitments), 
especially if they can exercise levers such as trade restrictions. The latter implies that, when 
special interests are predominant, domestic politics tends to be distorted in the direction 
preferred by the lobby groups that stand to gain the most, notwithstanding the global target [6]. 
The outcome of the recent turn in politics in the U.S., with president Trump’s election, 
represents a powerful reminder of the complex interplay between domestic forces and 
international policy. The work by Pye and colleagues provides a helpful baseline on which 
simulation endeavours accounting for strategic behaviour and political constraints should be 
performed in future research efforts. Such research holds promise for gaining a better 
understanding of the policies implemented by individual nations and blocs of countries, as well 
as to assist policy makers tasked with implementing the Paris Agreement at home. 
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